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Introduction  
The parliamentary election held in Thailand on February 6, 2005, was a critical conjuncture in that 
country's political evolution. The election marked the decisive entrenchment of the political 
hegemony of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the ruling Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party that 
emerged after he was elected Prime Minister in a landslide vote in January 2001. While TRT 
gained seventy-five percent of the seats in the House of Representatives, the main opposition 
force, the Democratic Party (DP), suffered a crushing defeat. Though it is evident that Thaksin 
and TRT won a convincing victory, it is not clear what will follow. Although TRT formed the first 
single party government in the history of Thailand's democracy in March 2005, it remains 
uncertain whether the reelected government can deal effectively with the country's urgent 
problems. 
Moreover, the election also represents the consolidation of several less positive trends that 
deepened over the past four years, including the division between the South and the rest of the 
country, problems of electoral quality, and the steady erosion of the institutions of liberal 
democracy. This article examines the likely prospects for Thailand in the aftermath of the 2005 
parliamentary election. It begins by reviewing the political background of the election. It then 
discusses several key elements of the election, including the campaign, its conduct, and the 
outcomes, which have important implications for Thai politics in the coming period. Next, it 
analyzes the causes for the triumph of Thaksin and his TRT and discusses several domestic 
political scenarios that might emerge in Thailand in the next four years. It concludes by examining 
the implications of the election for regional security and for U.S. interests in the coming years. 
Background  
Thailand's current democratic polity is the result of a long political struggle characterized by 
frequent alternation between authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes since the end of 
absolute monarchy in 1933. Throughout this period, the military and civil bureaucracy continually 
held political power until the late 1970's. However, long-term processes of economic and social 
change, together with the rise of private business and party politics starting in the 1970's, 
weakened the power of the ruling generals and bureaucrats. In the early 1980's, this development 
led to the liberalization of the "bureaucratic polity."[2] A "soft" authoritarian regime, which some 
Thai scholars described as "half democracy," emerged.[3] A former senior military officer 
appointed Prime Minister, who was not accountable to the elected House of Representatives, led 
the government. Meanwhile, the popularly elected House of Representatives (Lower House) had 
to share its political powers with an appointed Senate (Upper House), whose members were 
nominated by the government and came primarily from the ranks of the state bureaucracy and 
the Royal Thai Armed Forces. 
Political liberalization during the rule of Prime Minister General Prem (1981-1988) led to a short-
lived democratic interregnum between 1988-1991. Disgruntled generals under the leadership of 
General Suchinda staged a coup against the elected government in Spring 1991, abruptly ending 
this democratic interlude. Then in May 1992, an interim government under career diplomat Anand 
was installed and free and fair elections for the House of Representatives occurred in September 
of the same year.[4] 
The "Angel" parties who had opposed the coup d'etat of 1991 won a narrow victory in the 
September election, and subsequently formed a coalition cabinet under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai from the Democratic Party (DP). Even after transition to democracy in 
September 1992, the old bureaucratic elites were able to preserve significant political powers, 
particularly since the military defended its political and institutional autonomy as well as significant 
political prerogatives.[5] Furthermore, in the period after 1992, Thai democracy became 
synonymous with cabinet instability, chronic political corruption, vote buying, and the fusion of 
provincial crime with party politics. In Thai political discourse, party politics was reproached with 
incompetence, corruption, and a dubious morality. The obvious shortcomings of the democratic 
process—i.e. frequent changes in coalition governments (between September 1992 and March 
2000, the average cabinet durability was only about ten months),[6] three parliamentary elections 
within four years, intense patronage politics, the infusion of dark influences associated with 
provincial business elites in party politics, and the poor showing of the governments of Prime 
Ministers Banharn Silpa-Archa (1995-96) and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (1996-97)—created a 
dubious political climate. Thai economist Pasuk Phongpaichat characterized this as follows: "In 
the view of [civil society], the parliamentary system had simply been co-opted into the 
bureaucratic state. The battle was still between the people and the state, the people and 
paternalist domination, the people and rabop upatham, the patronage system which now 
encompassed not only bureaucrats but elected representatives. ...With this declining faith in 
'democracy' as the route to a better political future, and in parliamentary institutions as a 
mechanism of change, the idea of 'civil society' has been seized upon to play the [role] as the 
repository of hope."[7] 
A resulting political reform movement, based on a "tactical alliance between liberal, progressive 
and conservative forces to check the power of elected politicians." gained momentum.[8] The 
struggle for political and constitutional reforms eventually led to the passage of the sixteenth 
constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand in October 1997, accompanied by a broad package of 
additional reforms including electoral and bureaucratic measures.[9] Important constitutional and 
electoral reforms included the establishment of a powerful Election Commission, a popularly 
elected Senate, new Organic Laws on Political Parties and the Election of Members of the House 
of Representatives and Senators, an independent National Counter Corruption Commission, a 
constitutional Court, an Administrative Court, and a National Human Rights Commission.[10] 
As one western Thai scholar recently pointed out, "these new measures represented attempts to 
'engineer' greater democracy in Thailand."[11] However, the "architects of reform do not seem to 
have anticipated … potential drawbacks of their scheme. … Thailand's new constitution … is 
haunted by the law of unintended consequences, as measures designed to promote political 
stability threaten to have the opposite effect instead."[12] The most significant of these 
"unintended consequences" is the rise of a single political party and an all-powerful single political 
leader to near-hegemonic power. That single party is the Thai Rak Thai party, founded in 1998 by 
billionaire and politician-turned -telecommunication tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, who became 
prime minister in February 2001. Thaksin joined party politics in the early 1990's, but the rise of 
TRT and Thaksin to political power essentially occurred after the Financial Crisis and the 
constitutional reforms in 1997. Within only a couple of years Thaksin, frequently billed as one of 
Thailand's "richest men,"[13] strategically and systematically built up his party by luring away MPs 
from other parties and recruiting a base of eleven million party members (according to the party's 
own declaration), especially among the rural population, farmers and urban low income 
earners.[14] 
In the January 2001 parliamentary election, the Thai Rak Thai party and Thaksin Shinawatra ran 
one of the most expensive and most populist election campaigns in the history of Thailand.[15] 
Thaksin promised one million Baht (U.S. $23,000) for each of Thailand's more than 70,000 
villages, announced to suspend repayments of farmer's debts for three years, and promised a 
health insurance system in which any treatment would be available for 30 Baht (less than U.S. 
$1). Many voters, especially in the rural areas, turned to TRT out of frustration with the incumbent 
government of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai (Democratic Party), which came into office in 
November 1997 as an immediate consequence of the economic crisis sparked by the collapse of 
the Thai baht a few months earlier, believing that the recovery after the severe economic crisis of 
1997-98 had excluded them. Old style 'money politics' certainly contributed to TRT's victory as 
well. Furthermore, Thai Rak Thai capitalized on the new electoral system. The disproportional 
effect of the dominant first-past-the-post component in single-member constituencies worked in 
favor of the TRT. The 32.1 percent of nationwide votes garnered by Thai Rak Thai party in the 
constituency-based election translated into 49.8 percent of seats in the House of Representatives, 
which holds almost all legislative powers and elects the Prime Minister.[16] 
Thai Rak Thai won 248 seats in parliament (more than any other party previously) and therefore 
needed only three more seats to form a government. Nonetheless, Thaksin opted for a broad 
coalition, assimilating both the Chart Thai Party (forty-one seats) and the New Aspiration Party 
(thirty-six seats) as well as absorbing the smaller Seritham Party (fourteen).[17] Although TRT 
consists of more than a dozen different factions and has a large number of powerful old style 
politicians, Thaksin succeeded in assuming a dominant position in almost every aspect of party 
politics and government. His cabinet became the first democratically elected government in 
Thailand's history that survived a full legislative term. Contrary to the unstable multi-party coalition 
cabinets of the pre-Thaksin era, his government provided political continuity.  
Thailand was still suffering from the effects of the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 when Thaksin 
took office. After a shaky start in 2001, however, his government presided over an astonishing 
economic recovery. In addition to an impressive growth of GDP since 2002, Thailand's foreign 
debt has dropped by two-thirds, and exports have boomed. Inflation was kept under control and 
the unemployment rate, which had reached an all-time high in 1998-99, dropped by 50 percent. 
Furthermore, almost immediately after he took power, Thaksin begun to implement most of his 
populist campaign pledges. Stimulating domestic demand in the short run through increased 
government expenditures became a core element of "Thaksinomics." which included several 
programs and schemes from which especially farmers, the urban poor and the rural population 
benefited. These included farm assistance and urban relief programs, the Village and Urban 
Revolving Fund, the establishment of the People's Bank and the Bank for Small- and Medium-
Sized Enterprises, the One Tambon Project, and the 30-Baht Health Scheme.[18] 
That economic success has earned Thaksin high popularity but also has accompanied less 
positive trends in political development throughout the past four years. Since the advent of the 
Thaksin government in 2001, many of the democratic characteristics of Thailand's polity have 
progressively eroded. Simultaneously, there has been a pronounced authoritarian shift in the 
character of Thai politics. 
Table 1: Major Economic Indicators, Thailand 1997-2004 (%)[19] 
   1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  
Growth of GDP  -1.4  -10.5  4.4  4.8  2.1  5.4  6.7  7.2  
Growth of GDP p.c.  -2.3  -11.5  3.4  4.6  0.5  4.5  5.8  6.4  
Growth of merchandise exports  3.8  -6.8  7.4  19.5  -7.1  4.8  18.6  14  
Growth of merchandise imports  -13.4  -33.8  16.9  31.3  -3  4.6  17.1  17.8  
Current account balance/GDP  -2.1  12.8  10.2  7.6  5.4  5.5  5.6  3.9  
Inflation rate (CPI)  5.6  8.1  0.3  1.6  1.6  0.7  1.8  2.4  
Money supply (M3) growth  2.0  9.5  2.1  3.7  4.2  2.6  4.9  1.9  
Gross domestic 
investment/GDP  
33.7  20.4  20.5  22.8  24.1  23.9  25.2  25.7  
Gross domestic savings/GDP  33.6  36.1  32.8  31.0  30.0  30.5  28.7  29.6  
Unemployment  1.5  4.4  4.2  3.6  3.3  2.4  2.2  n/a  
Fiscal balance/GDP  -1.9  -2.5  -2.9  -2.4  -2.1  -2.2  0.6  -0.1  
Debt service ratio  15.7  21.4  19.4  15.4  20.8  19.6  15  13.5  
The powers of the government to constrain civil rights became unprecedented, as demonstrated 
in the three-months long "war on drugs" in 2003, during which legions of suspected drug dealers 
and users—most of them young men—were gunned down in the streets of their towns or villages. 
Government reports indicate 2,245 people were killed in all.[20]  
Simultaneously, policy failures of the incumbent government and the PM's insensitivity in dealing 
with the country's Malay-Muslim minority in the South have significantly contributed to deepening 
ethno-religious violence in Thailand's three southernmost provinces since 2001.[21] Increased 
insurgent activity and intensity of attacks in the South throughout the past four years have 
resulted in an unprecedented level of violence. The implementation of two new anti-terrorism 
decrees in 2003 triggered additional worries that the government could justify human rights 
violations in the interest of its national counterterrorism strategy.[22]  
The ruling TRT clearly aspired to dominate the political landscape by absorbing smaller parties 
and excluding opposition parties from political decision-making. In addition, by attempts to 
compromise the moral and constitutional strength of institutions like the Constitutional Court and 
the National Counter Corruption Commission, the government has increasingly diminished the 
checks and balances that the 1997 constitution had established in order to strengthen liberal 
democracy.[23] Civil-military relations, one of the persistent problems of past Thai politics, also 
reflects the general trend of faltering consolidation and worsening democratic standards. By co-
opting large numbers of high ranking officers into the cabinet and utilizing annual military 
reshuffles for entrenching a strong network of personal friends and relatives in key positions 
within the army, Thaksin succeeded in placing all military decision-making powers in his own 
hands.[24] 
In addition to bringing the military into line with his government's policies, Thaksin used military-
run radio and television stations for party purposes. In recent years, the country's historically 
vocal print media has been notably restrained when it comes to allegations of conflicts of interest 
involving senior government figures. Companies associated with members of the cabinet have 
purchased major shares of independent newspapers and other media enterprises. Furthermore, 
the government threatens anyone who makes conflict-of-interest allegations against the PM with 
lawsuits or criminal charges. Together with the government's control of other public media and 
the Prime Minister's own media enterprises, this has allowed the government to monopolize the 
media.[25] 
 
The 2005 Parliamentary Election  
The previous election of the governor of Bangkok, held in August 2004, had surprisingly brought 
a narrow victory for Apirak Kosayodhin, who was running on the opposition Democrat Party's 
ticket, over Pavena Hongsakula, an independent candidate, who enjoyed support from the Thai 
Rak Thai party. The TRT's poor showing in the 2004 Bangkok election and opinion polls released 
in the later part of 2004 indicated that Thaksin and TRT suffered from declining popular 
support.[26] For a while it seemed that the PM was losing ground to opponents who charged that: 
his heavy -handed rule threatened Thailand's young democracy, he needlessly inflamed the 
Muslim insurgency in the South, his populist economic policies were risky and unsustainable, and 
he had adopted policies that enriched his friends and his own business empire. The tsunami that 
struck six coastal provinces in Thailand's South—Phangnga, Phuket, Krabi, Ranong, Satun and 
Trang—on December 26, 2004, however, presented Thaksin with an opportunity to regain 
popularity by showing his strong and disciplined leadership during the crisis. The following six 
weeks before election day, criticism of the government almost vanished from the national media 
while Thaksin emerged with even a stronger popularity from the crisis. Close observers of Thai 
politics anticipated the February 2005 election to be a clear referendum for Thaksin. 
Electoral System  
The 1997 constitution adopted a mixed system for election to the House of Representatives. 
Under the new system, of the 500 members of the House of Representatives, 400 are elected by 
first-past-the-post (FPTP) in single member constituencies and the remaining by proportional rule 
under the party-list system. Voters cast two votes. The first is a vote for an individual candidate 
for each of the 400 single member constituencies. Each of Thailand's seventy-six provinces, 
including the capital city Bangkok, is divided into smaller constituencies of approximately equal 
population that send one representative each to the House of Representatives. The number of 
constituencies per province varies between one and thirty-seven in Bangkok, which is by far the 
largest. 
The second vote is for the party-list. Each political party submits a list of candidates, comprising 
not more than one hundred persons, to the Election Commission (EC). Any party receiving less 
than five percent of the total votes for the party-list will not have its candidates elected and its 
votes will be eliminated. The remaining votes are divided by one hundred to determine the 
number of votes needed for each candidate. The number of party-list representatives that each 
party may send to Parliament is calculated by dividing the votes each party obtained by the 
number of votes needed for one party-list candidate (d'Hondt formula). Cabinet ministers can only 
be appointed from the ranks of party-list MPs or they have to resign their constituency seats and 
pay for the re-run of the election of their vacated seat. 
Voting is compulsory under the new constitution. Failure to vote without notifying the authorities of 
the appropriate cause may lead to revocation of certain political rights. Candidates must be 
members of the political party which nominates them for at least ninety days before the election 
and must not hold multiple party memberships. Since 1997, candidates in an election are 
required to possess at least a bachelor's degree or equivalent. This and other qualifications 
exclude more than ninety-five percent of the Thai electorate from the right to run for office.[27] 
To enforce these new rules, the 1997 Constitution created the independent Election Commission 
of Thailand, who is in charge of running and supervising the general election. The powers and 
duties of the newly established Election Commission include organizing elections of the members 
of the House of Representatives and Senators, investigating poll fraud, disqualifying and 
punishing candidates in cases of "convincing evidence" of irregularities, and ordering re-election 
when there exists credible evidence that the election was not just and fair. However, the EC must 
endorse winners within thirty days of the original polling day. Experience of the January 2001 
election has shown that this deadline makes it difficult for the EC to thoroughly investigate all 
reports of fraud.[28] 
Parties, Candidates and Campaigns  
Traditionally, Thai politics was characterized by a deeply fragmented, volatile, ideologically weak 
and highly personalized party system with only very weak social linkages (Hicken, forthcoming). 
However, supported by the new electoral system and the 2001 election, significant party 
realignment has occurred in the past couple of years.[29] The trend is from a highly fragmented 
albeit low ideologically polarized party system with shallow programmatic profiles of, and thus 
only rudimentary policy differences between, individual political parties towards deepening 
polarization between two large political parties with different political platforms and clearly 
distinguished groups of voters. While the 2001 election intensified this development, the 2005 
election has consolidated it. 
On the one side of the political spectrum is the Democratic Party, the oldest party in Thailand, 
founded in 1946. Although the Democrats suffered from old style politics and political corruption, 
in the past the party was often viewed as a force of democratic and economic reforms. Under the 
leadership of Chuan Leekpai, the DP transformed from a largely provincially-based party that was 
dominated by southern politicians in the early 1990's to a party that had a base of support 
particularly among business and white-collar middle class people in Bangkok, although the South 
remained the party's main stronghold.[30] Opposite the Democrats stands the TRT, founded by 
Thaksin Shinawatra in late 1998 to counter the DP's urban bias. The party seeks support from 
businesspersons and rural farmers who felt they had been neglected during the 1997 economic 
crisis. As already mentioned, the party platform is often described as populist because of the 
political style of its founder-leader and its concrete social and economic policy programs.[31] 
Regionally, its strongholds are the Northeast, Thailand's least developed region, Central and the 
North, Thaksin's native region. 
Although twenty parties nominated candidates with the Election Commission for the February 
2005 election, only two other parties besides TRT and Democrats had a realistic chance to win a 
significant number of parliament seats. These were the Chart Thai party of former Prime Minister 
Banharn Silpa-Archa and the newly revamped Mahachon (People's) Party. The Mahachon Party 
emerged from the smaller Rassadorn Party on July 19, 2004. After changing its name the party 
was taken over by former DP secretary-general Sanan Kachornprasart and subsequently became 
a reservoir for disgruntled members of the Democratic Party.[32] As a result of the electoral 
reform of 1997 and the subsequent concentration of party politics in Thailand, the total number of 
candidates registered with the EC diminished from 2,782 constituency candidates and 940 party-
list candidates in 2001 to 1,267 and 582 respectively in 2005. Furthermore, most parties 
registered only a handful of candidates. 
Compared with the previous election, the share of female party-list candidates more than doubled, 
although it still was quite low. There were some significant changes in the occupational 
backgrounds of party-list candidates in the 2005 general election. In contrast to 2001, the 
percentage of businessmen and civil servants sharply declined, while the number employees and 
professional politicians increased.  
Although the data is only available for party-list candidates, this supports some analysts' 
observation that the relevance of individual provincial businessmen-turned politicians and former 
civil servants in party politics is diminishing. This perhaps is an intended consequence of the 
electoral reform in 1997, which explicitly aimed to weaken the influence of local power brokers on 
national politics and to strengthen political parties. 
 
Table 2: Number of Candidates by Region and Party in 2005[33] 
   NORTH  CENTRAL  NORTHEAST  SOUTH  BANGKOK  PARTY LIST  
CHART THAI  25  47  71  25  35  100  
SOCIAL ACTION  -  -  -  -  -  5  
PATTANA CHART 
THAI  
-  -  -  -  -  5  
DEMOCRAT  76  89  109  54  37  100  
THAI PEOPLE  -  -  -  -  -  47  
KHONKHOPOLDNEE 2  -  -  -  -  28  
THAI NATURE  -  -  -  -  -  5  
THAI GROUND  -  -  -  -  -  5  
THAI RAK THAI  76  97  136  54  37  100  
NEW ASPIRATION  5  -  -  -  -  20  
MAHACHON  56  57  110  27  36  100  
THAI CITIZEN  -  -  -  -  -  10  
THAI CUAHY THAI  -  -  -  -  -  9  
LABOUR  -  -  -  -  -  7  
NATIONAL 
DEMOCRATIC  
-  -  -  -  -  7  
KASIKORN THAI  -  -  -  -  -  5  
THAI ALTERNATIVE  -  -  -  -  1  5  
THE GREEN PARTY 
OF THAILAND 
-  -  -  -  -  8  
THE FARMER 
FORCE  
-  -  -  -  -  11  
PEOPLE POWER  -  -  -  -  -  5  
ENTIRE KINGDOM 240  290  426  160  145  582  
Simultaneously, it is also an unintended consequence of the rise to power of businessman-
politician Thaksin, which has seriously weakened the fragmented power structure of Thai politics 
that allowed provincial business to reinforce their economic power with political influence.  
Thai Rak Thai's campaign issues were essentially a renewed version of its populist 2001 platform 
plus a repackage of several existing government policies and projects to particularly attract 
Bangkok voters. Under the slogan of "Four Years of Repair—Four years of Reconstruction" (later 
changed into "Building Opportunities"), ten issues dominated the party campaign:[35]  
· Poverty eradication;  
· Reform of the education system;  
· Financial assistance for small farmers;  
· Extension of the 30-Baht health scheme introduced in 2001;  
· New public housing projects for low-income earners;  
· Support for infrastructure projects in Bangkok as part of TRT's "Healthy Bangkok" 
campaign in order to improve traffic and environmental problems;  
· Improved public care for elderly and children;  
· Reform of public administration;  
· Fighting corruption; and  
· Pacifying the unrest in the South.  
Even though the opposition criticized the TRT program and policies as "populist," both Democrats 
and Chart Thai developed their own populist agenda, promising more jobs, free education and 
health care, and combating crime and corruption. Furthermore, during the campaign, 
representatives from all main opposition parties refused to give details of their policies. They thus 
provided little evidence that they were more willing to pursue concrete alternative policies to the 
"populist" programs of TRT. The Democrats and Mahachon also attacked the TRT's record on 
human rights and violence in the South. 
Figure 1: Gender and Occupational Backgrounds of Party List Candidates in 2001 and 
2005[34]  
 
Even though the opposition criticized the TRT program and policies as "populist," both Democrats 
and Chart Thai developed their own populist agenda, promising more jobs, free education and 
health care, and combating crime and corruption. Furthermore, during the campaign, 
representatives from all main opposition parties refused to give details of their policies. They thus 
provided little evidence that they were more willing to pursue concrete alternative policies to the 
"populist" programs of TRT. The Democrats and Mahachon also attacked the TRT's record on 
human rights and violence in the South. They warned voters against the emergence of a 
parliamentary dictatorship and the authoritarian leadership of Thaksin. However, the opposition 
failed to offer compelling alternatives to the popular Prime Minister. Both the Democrat's "201" 
campaign, in which it sought 201 House seats, and Mahachon's corresponding "110" campaign, 
did not register with the electorate. 
Election Results  
Despite some calls after the tsunami disaster to reschedule the election, it was held on the 
scheduled day. Voter turnout reached a record high 75.1 percent. The number of invalid votes 
that had reached a record high of ten percent in 2001 declined to four percent. Thaksin and TRT 
won a landslide victory and received almost two-thirds of the party-list votes. Both the Democrats 
and Mahachon suffered a crushing defeat. The DP gained less than one-quarter of the votes. The 
Mahachon Party received only 4.36 percent of the party-list votes and failed to meet the five 
percent threshold needed to send candidates on the party-list ticket to parliament. Finally, the 
Chart Thai took 6.63 percent of the votes.[36] Due to its strength at the district level, TRT won 
more than 75 percent of the total seats in the House of Representatives, the largest number a 
party has ever won in Thai elections. As a final feat, TRT succeeded in winning Bangkok, a 
former Democrat stronghold.  
Table 3: Results of the February 2005 Election[37]  











TRT  DP  CHART 
THAI  
MAHACHON  
NORTH  8,435,050  76.4  4.6  76  71  5  0  0  
NORTHEAST  15,357,447  72.0  4.3  136  126  2  6  2  
CENTRAL  11,070,436  79.1  3.5  97  79  8  10  0  
SOUTH  5,838,497  77.0  3.9  54  1  52  1  0  
BANGKOK  4,145,042  71.2  2.9  37  32  4  1  0  
ENTIRE-
KINGDOM  
44,846,472  75.1  4.0  400  309  71  18  2  
PARTY-LIST  44,846,472  69.5  4.0  100  67  25  8  0  
The election result supports the recent trend in Thai party politics from extreme pluralism to single 
party dominance. The effective number of parties in the House of Representatives decreased 
from three in 2001 to 1.6 in 2005. That is just one third of the average number (4.95) since 
transition to democracy in September 1992.[38] 
Table 4: Winner and Losers of the 2005 Election[39] 
  % OF PARTY -LIST VOTES  % OF SEATS IN PARLIAMENT  
  2001  2005  2001  2005  
THAI RAK THAI  38.87  61.13  49.6  75.2  
DEMOCRATS  25.43  23.26  24.6  19.2  
CHART THAI  5.10  6.63  8.2  5.2  
NEW ASPIRATION PARTY  6.71  *  7.4  *  
CHART PATTANA  5.87  *  5.8  *  
MAHACHON  +  4.36  +  0.2  
OTHERS  6.28  4.62  4.4  0.0  
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF 
PARTIES  
4.4  2.28  3.0  1.6  
* Party merged into Thai Rak Thai; + Party did not run in the 2001 election.  
The vote followed clear geographic patterns. Thai Rak Thai was strongly supported everywhere 
but in the South, which the DP successfully regained. In the February election, TRT lost all seats 
it had controlled after the "Wada faction" of Deputy Prime Minister Wan Huamad Noor Matha 
from the New Aspiration Party had merged with TRT in 2001 and four Democrat MPs from the 
South defected to TRT in August 2004.[40]  
Figure 2: Elections in the South, 1975-2005[41] 
 
The sharp drop in support for TRT and related party factions in the Muslim-dominated southern 
provinces does not necessarily mean that a number of Malay voters in Pattani, Narathiwat and 
Yala switched their support to the Democrats. A large number of these voters probably consist of 
people who became disillusioned with the "Wada faction" and DP-renegades within the TRT and 
decided to cast a protest vote against the Thaksin government. However, the fact remains that 
the Democratic Party, despite loosing the election, was able to strengthen its already powerful 
position in the South, which in turn deepens Thailand's political divide between the South and the 
rest. 
Despite efforts to clean up the system, vote buying and electoral violence remained problems of 
electoral quality in 2005. Anecdotal information from official announcements, press reports, and 
surveys conducted shortly before the election indicate that the established mechanisms of bullet-
and-baths politics worked again. The concrete extent, however, to which guns and gold played a 
role in the 2005 campaign, remains unclear. In 2001, forty-three politicians, canvassers and 
bureaucrats were shot dead nationwide in election-related acts of violence, particularly in the 
North and Northeast.[42] Furthermore, the Election Commission has called new polls in sixty-two 
constituencies after "red cards" were handed to candidates in eight of those districts and "yellow 
cards" in the other fifty-four. Those with red cards were barred from contesting by-elections while 
candidates given yellow cards could still run in the following vote.  
Yet, after the 2001 election, "the EC's autonomy and neutrality became increasingly dubious, and 
it began tilting toward the party in power."[43] The packing of the Commission with 
commissioners associated with TRT and sympathetic to Thaksin since 2001 is interpreted by 
some analysts as a major reason for the EC's failure in 2005 to investigate allegations of illegal 
use of government power to favor the ruling Thai Rak Thai party. Furthermore, the Commission 
disqualified only two candidates for electoral irregularities—both Democrats.[44] 
The PollWatch Foundation, Thailand's most prominent election watchdog, declared that vote 
buying in this election, specifically in the North and the Northeast, was more serious than in the 
2001 election. The organization also accused the government of violating the election law by 
abusing state power in presenting new projects in a bid to seek votes. Reports from additional 
groups pointed to several more subtle vote-buying methods which gained popularity in the 2005 
election such as pyramid schemes to buy canvassers, buying the votes of employees at small 
companies and buying the votes of entire families.[45] Other reports, however, provide support to 
the argument that less cash than in previous elections changed hands and electoral violence was 
below the levels reached in earlier years. A survey conducted among 13,836 community leaders 
in all 400 constituencies throughout the country between January 24 and February 2, 2005, 
discovered widespread vote buying, totaling almost 10 billion Baht (approximately US $250 
million), which would constitute a large decrease in the amount of money spent for vote-buying 
compared with previous elections.[46] 
Figure 3: Estimated Amount of Money Spent in Vote Buying, 1995-2005, Billion Baht[47]  
 
Some Thai political scientists support the view that there was a decrease of vote-buying, quoting 
several factors which contributed to this development: first, the sharper policy-profile of the 
political parties in the 2005 election; second, the fact that most contests in constituencies across 
the country were heavily lopsided and TRT candidates were so far out in front that vote buying 
would have made little difference; third, that populist policies and pledges of government 
expenditures replaced vote buying as the preferred method of securing votes.[48] 
According to statements from the National Police Office, official police records note that acts of 
election-related violence such as shootings, killings and attempted murder were reduced by more 
than half when compared with 2001. The number of pre-election killings of canvassers nationwide 
reported by the police to the Thai press two days before the election day, however, exceeded the 
final numbers, which casts doubts about the reliability of the official numbers. Furthermore, our 
breakdown of incidents of election violence reported in two Thai newspapers (Bangkok Post  and 
The Nation) throughout the period December 1, 2004 to February 6, 2004 indicates fifteen 
incidents of election-related violence in which ten people were killed and another eight were 
wounded which substantiates these doubts.[49] 
Causes and Implications for Thailand's Future  
On March 9, 2005, during the second sitting of the new House, Thaksin was re-elected as 
Thailand's 23rd prime minister with the majority vote of 377:1 and 116 abstentions. While all 
Democrats and all but one MP from the Chart Thai party abstained, the two MPs from Mahachon 
voted for Thaksin.[50] For the first time in Thailand's democracy, a single-party government was 
formed. In order to immunize the cabinet against corrosion from intra-party feuds and factionalism, 
the Prime Minister arranged portfolios in such a way that every major intra-party faction felt it had 
a fair share of rewards, while at the same time the PM's own faction was strengthened. 
Subsequently, the new cabinet includes thirty-five ministers from fifteen TRT factions.[51] 
The outcome of the 2005 general election certainly reflects the political preferences of the vast 
majority of Thailand's voters. Although the electoral playing field was tilted in favor of the ruling 
party, almost all domestic and foreign monitors agree that the election was sufficiently free and 
fair in order to label the February poll 'democratic'. In spite of initial wariness about disruptive 
actions from Muslim insurgents, the election proceeded without major incidents, particularly in the 
South. Support from 10,000 of the almost 20,000 soldiers on duty at that time in Yala, Pattani and 
Narathiwat probably helped local election committees to hold ballots.[52] Nevertheless, the fear of 
attacks certainly prompted prospective MP candidates in the southernmost provinces to avoid 
public events and created a lackluster campaign in that part of the country. 
With the lack of reliable exit-polls surveying the reasons why voters made their concrete choice, 
there is no certain evidence of the causes for the overwhelming victory of TRT and Thaksin in the 
2005 general election. It is plausible to assess that the election result was the outcome of multiple 
causes. The TRT utilized the high popularity of the party's founder-leader and successfully 
orchestrated a campaign that heavily drew on new campaign techniques, populism, the party's 
financial and administrative resources, and its dominance of the country's media. Simultaneously, 
many smaller but well established opposition parties had joined the ruling party after the January 
2001 election and strengthened the political networks and electoral machines at the constituency 
level. The Democratic Party had still not recovered from its paralysis after the shock of loosing the 
2001 election; furthermore, the split between Mahachon and the Democratic Party further 
weakened the main opposition party. In contrast to numerous liberal critics, NGOs and human 
rights groups inside and outside Thailand, controversial policies, such as Thaksin's heavy-handed 
law and order policy, and the crackdown on drugs in 2003, have had overwhelming popular 
approval. Another factor that supported the incumbent government in the February election was 
the "tsunami-effect." This helped the government overcome the erosion of TRT's support among 
voters, particularly in Bangkok, resulting from rising concerns about the situation in the country's 
deep South in late 2004. Thai Rak Thai's victory also supports the argument that Thaksin 
succeeded in attempting to establish a new social contract for Thailand, in which the government 
promises to deliver economic and social "benefits to citizens in exchange for political support."[53] 
While some critics of the incumbent government call this "bribery," "vote buying," or "corrupting 
the Thai people," it seems that a large majority of Thai voters view this rather as a new form of 
government that is characterized by an hitherto unknown responsiveness to their own material 
needs.  
The overwhelming victory of Thai Rak Thai in the February election has already created a new 
political landscape. Immediately after the poll, the Mahachon party began to show signs of rapid 
disintegration and it is highly possible that party leader Maj Gen Sanan Kachornprasart will soon 
dissolve the party.[54] Within the Democratic Party, post-election blues has rekindled intra-party 
power struggles. Party leader Banyat Bantadtan resigned along with the party's secretary general 
and seventeen other party leaders on February 7 and the party will probably be occupied with 
inter-factional conflicts for some more time. Chart Thai party leader Banharn Silpa-Archa declared 
his intentions to cooperate with the new government on an issue-by-issue base. Given these 
developments, it is highly unlikely that the Thaksin government will face determined and strong 
resistance from the opposition banks in parliament in the near future.  
Thai Rak Thai's victory also signals the transformation of Thailand's party system from extreme 
pluralism to what Giovanni Sartori called a "predominant party system" in which a couple of 
political parties compete for votes in free and fair elections, but one party continuously succeeds 
in being the decisive actor in forming the government. Other parties may participate in coalitions 
(as in 2001), but they have no political leverage against the predominant party. Political power 
rests with one party only in spite of free elections. Alternation in government does not occur.[55] 
The positive implication of Thai Rak Thai's legislative superiority and Thaksin's consolidated 
position as hegemonic political leader for Thailand's future economic and political development is 
four more years of stable government. However, this is not necessarily good news for Thai 
democracy.  
There is some chance that a major challenge will emerge to Thaksin and TRT. This is possible for 
three reasons. First, it remains to be seen if the strongly factionalized TRT will be able to 
establish a more cohesive and effective government than the oversized coalition cabinets that 
dominated Thai politics in the 1990s. Competition between many small coalition parties over 
access to public funds and state resources was one reason for corruption, policy blockades and 
inefficient economic policies that led to the past financial crisis and rendered the quick 
implementation of viable remedies to the crisis difficult.[56] However, the demise of extreme 
pluralism and the rise of one-party dominance in party politics may only be accompanied by a 
simultaneous shift from multiple "veto players" to a more flexible constellation of "veto players" in 
legislative politics, if competition between various coalition parties is not simply transformed into 
intra-party and inter-factional levels. 
Second, uncertainties of Thaksinomics cast doubts about the sustainability of Thailand's current 
growth model. Given the rise of private household debts, and often mixed results of concrete 
development projects such as the Village Fund, which has provided the rural poor with money to 
not only generate income (for example, investments in rice paddies) but also to waste on mobile 
phones and to pay of other debts,[57] efforts to stimulate domestic growth by encouraging private 
consumption may soon backfire. Moreover, the collusion between business and politics within 
government and Thai Rak Thai may strengthen negative side-effects (corruption, waste of public 
resources, etc.), which could threaten the effective implementation of policies. Together, these 
threats may cause a sudden economic downturn which could erode the political support of Thai 
voters for Thaksin. 
Third, even if Thaksinomics is sustainable in the longer term, stability of government and 
legislative majority has been achieved at the expense of inclusiveness of the political system, 
transparency, and accountability of the political process. The February election has undoubtedly 
deepened Thailand's political cleavage between the South and the rest of the country. Given the 
overwhelming support TRT and Thaksin gained from the majority of Thais, electoral incentives for 
a change in the government's heavy -handed counterinsurgency policy in the south towards non-
military and long-term oriented measures that could offer viable solutions for the root causes of 
the recent trouble are weak. Indeed, immediately after the election, the reelected Prime Minister 
gave a number of highly controversial comments and suggestions for dealing with the problem 
such as an ill-advised "zoning proposal," thus supporting this evaluation. 
Furthermore, as analysts point out, with TRT in firm control of the parliament, "there is little that 
other parties can do to counterbalance TRT, even if all other parties unite in opposition. It takes 
votes from 200 MPs to launch a motion to censure a prime minister and 125 votes to consider 
impeachment against a government official. One hundred votes are required to launch a censure 
motion against a minister who is not the PM."[58] Considering the Prime Minister's ambiguous 
record and policies of the past four years, the paradox of Thailand's 2005 general election is that 
a large majority of Thailand's demos has decided to exercise its democratic rights to bring about 
a political outcome that opens a wide window of opportunity for the temptations of self-destruction 
of democracy by the ""tyranny of the majority" (Tocqueville) or the despotic rule of democratically 
legitimated rulers. The opposition's inability to use parliamentary measures to control the 
government and the overwhelming legislative power of the ruling party offer favorable opportunity 
structures for the rise of a "defective democracy"[59] in which the government circumvents 
challenging and controlling powers, and encroaches, curtails or evades many of the democratic 
and rule of law controls established in the 1997 constitution without formally breaking the 
constitution. In view of the Prime Minister's tendency over the past four years to exclude other 
political and social actors from political decision-making and taking advantage of the full range of 
his constitutional and legal powers, there is a genuine danger that the government may use its 
democratic legitimacy and the full-weight of its legislative power to fortify its own political power. 
This may even occur at the expense of the liberal democratic substance of Thailand's polity. 
Implications for Regional Security and U.S. Interests  
Given the overwhelming election victory of Thaksin and his party, and the stability which the 
ensuing single-party government promises, it would at first seem that the election result bodes 
well for the future of both regional security and U.S. interests. Stability in government could help 
the ruling regime take a more leading role in Southeast Asia's security dynamic. Furthermore, a 
stronger leader like Thaksin who is willing to support the United States in its war against terrorism 
is certainly of benefit to the United States. Nonetheless, when examined on a deeper level, the 
Thaksin regime could prove disastrous for regional security and the interests of the United States. 
The reasons for this center on what is proving to be Thaksin's Achilles heel- the insurgency in 
southern Thailand. As the insurgency has grown in recent years and months, there have been 
examples of the violence spreading beyond the three southernmost provinces. The early April 
2005 simultaneous bombings of the airport, a hotel, and a grocery store in Hat Yai are a recent 
example of this spread. Many signs suggest that the insurgent violence will further spread outside 
the immediate southernmost region. Should this happen, the chance of internal political 
destabilization would increase. In the worst case scenario, such instability could spill over 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, leading to serious ramifications for regional security.  
The Thaksin government has already in no uncertain terms made it clear to ASEAN that 
Thailand's southern problem is Thailand's alone and that no other nation need concern itself 
about this crisis. Yet given the Malay-Muslim aspect of the insurgency, the support of other 
nations, particularly Malaysia, may be necessary for conflict resolution. Furthermore, the Thai 
security forces' lack of organization, understanding, and clearly defined goals in addressing this 
insurgency creates an environment in which external aid may be required. However, bilateral 
relations between Thailand and Malaysia have never been as poor as they are currently.  
The expanding insurgency is also paralleled by a growing conflict in the government's security 
staff. The course of developments in the south has already made many ranking Thai military 
officials feel uneasy about the government policies, including promotion and key placement in the 
armed forces of those with family or TRT ties ahead of those whose turn at promotion was rightly 
due. Should the chasm between Thaksin and the veteran military officials continue to widen, this 
could have negative consequences for political stability as well as regional security.  
At this point, there is scant if any substantial evidence of concrete links between Thailand's 
southern insurgents and transnational terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiah and Al Qaeda. 
However, the longer the crisis persists and the further the violence spreads, the conditions for 
transnational terrorist involvement become all the more fertile. Should transnational terrorism 
indeed become a component of the current insurgency, the crisis becomes a critical problem for 
both regional security and the interests of the United States.  
The primary foreign policy concern for the United States is currently the war on terrorism. Thus it 
is in the best interests of the United States that the southern Thailand insurgency soon be 
resolved. Unfortunately, the experiences so far with four years of Thaksin government make it 
hard to believe that after four more years the situation in the deep south will have improved. The 
United States must proceed cautiously. Politically, should the United States strongly support a 
TRT regime that continues to abandon democratic standards for authoritarianism, it could in 
effect be supporting a complete breakdown in Thailand's already fragile democracy. Should the 
United States become more directly involved in helping resolve the southern insurgency, the 
effect could be not only the worsening of the crisis, but an overall backlash from the Muslims in 
Southeast Asia. Thaksin's Achilles heel would then become the same for the United States. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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